Operation Northwoods (1962)

Operation Northwoods

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Operation Northwoods was a series of false flag proposals that originated within the United States government in 1962, but were rejected by the Kennedy 

administration.^[2] The proposals called for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or other operatives, to commit perceived acts of terrorism in U.S. cities and 

elsewhere. These acts of terrorism were to be blamed on Cuba in order to create public support for a war against that nation, which had recently become 

communist under Fidel Castro.^[3]One part of Operation Northwoods was to "develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida 

cities and even in Washington".

Operation Northwoods proposals included hijackings and bombings followed by the introduction of phony evidence that would implicate the Cuban government. 

It stated:

The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from

a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

Several other proposals were included within Operation Northwoods, including real or simulated actions against various U.S. military and civilian targets. The 

plan was drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed by Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and sent to the Secretary of Defense. Although part of the U.S. government's 

Cuban Project anti-communist initiative, Operation Northwoods was never officially accepted; it was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but then rejected by 

President John F. Kennedy.

According to currently released documentation, none of the operations became active under the auspices of the Operation Northwoods proposals.

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 Origins and public release
• 2 Content
• 3 Related Operation Mongoose proposals
• 4 Reaction
• 5 See also
• 6 References
• 7 Further reading
• 8 External links

Origins and public release[edit]

The main proposal was presented in a document entitled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," a top secret collection of draft memoranda written 

by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).^[1] The document was presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert 

McNamara on 13 March 1962 as a preliminary submission for planning purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that both the covert and overt aspects of 

any such operation be assigned to them.

The previously secret document was originally made public on 18 November 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board,^[4] a U.S. federal 

agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy's assassination.^[5][6] A total of 1,521 pages of once-secret military records covering 

1962 to 1964 were concomitantly declassified by said Review Board.

"Appendix to Enclosure A" and "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on 

6 November 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of its 1998 Cold War television documentary series^[7][8]—specifically, as a documentation supplement to 

"Episode 10: Cuba," which aired on 29 November 1998.^[9] "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage 

terrorist attacks.

The Northwoods document was published online in a more complete form, including cover memoranda, by the National Security Archive on 30 April 2001.^[10]

Content[edit]

In response to a request for pretexts for military intervention by the Chief of Operations of the Cuba Project, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the document listed methods, 

and outlined plans, that the authors believed would garner public and international support for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. According to Jacob Hornberger:

The plan called for U.S. personnel to disguise themselves as agents of the Cuban government and to engage in terrorist attacks on the U.S. base at Guantanamo

Bay. It also called for terrorist attacks within the United States that would be conducted by pro-U.S. forces disguising themselves as Cuban agents.

More specifically, the plan called for the following:

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for U.S. military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite 

   preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment 

   plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a 

   rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban 
   forces.

   a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

   1. Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
   2. Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.
   3. Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
   4. Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).^[11]
   5. Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
   6. Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
   7. Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.
   8. Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
   9. Capture militia group which storms the base.
   10. Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires—naphthalene.
   11. Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be in lieu of (10)).

   b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which 

   threaten the base.

   c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

   a. We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

   b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or 

   Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of 

   the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to 

   those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The United States could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by U.S. 

   fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in U.S. newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.^[12]
   The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or 
   simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. 
   Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, 
   also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14 June invasion of the Dominican 
6. Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and 
7. possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the 
8. Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc 
9. incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments 
10. of arm which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
11. Use of MIG type aircraft by U.S. pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of U.S. 
12. military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw 
13. a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk 
14. inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from U.S. resources in about three months.^[13]
15. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, 
16. genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
17. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from 
    the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama, or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The 
    passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled 
    flight.
    a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the 

    Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all 

    boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

    b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the 

    passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to 

    evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba 

    the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The 

    transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio^[14] stations in the Western 

    Hemisphere to tell the United States what has happened to the aircraft instead of the United States trying to "sell" the incident.

18. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft 
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

19. a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course 

    and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews 

    would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions 

    were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

    b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would 

    broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low 

    altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot 

    who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then 

    have disappeared.

    c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down, a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., 

    at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search 

    ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.^[15]

James Bamford wrote on Northwoods:

Operation Northwoods, which had the written approval of the Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent people to be shot on

American streets; for boats carrying refugees fleeing Cuba to be sunk on the high seas; for a wave of violent terrorism to be launched in Washington, D.C., 

Miami, and elsewhere. People would be framed for bombings they did not commit; planes would be hijacked. Using phony evidence, all of it would be blamed

          on Castro, thus giving Lemnitzer and his cabal the excuse, as well as the public and international backing, they needed to launch their war.^[16]

Related Operation Mongoose proposals[edit]

In addition to Operation Northwoods, under the Operation Mongoose program the U.S. Department of Defense had a number of similar proposals to be taken against 

the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro.

Twelve of these proposals come from a 2 February 1962 memorandum entitled "Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass or Disrupt Cuba," written by Brig. Gen. William H. 

Craig and submitted to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the commander of the Operation Mongoose project.^[17][6]

The memorandum outlines Operation Bingo, a plan to; "create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing an 

excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba."

It also includes Operation Dirty Trick, a plot to blame Castro if the 1962 Mercury manned space flight carrying John Glenn crashed, saying: "The objective is to provide 

irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al. Cuba [sic]." It continues, "This to be accomplished by 

manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans."

Even after General Lemnitzer lost his job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still planned false-flag pretext operations at least into 

1963. A different U.S. Department of Defense policy paper created in 1963 discussed a plan to make it appear that Cuba had attacked a member of the Organization 

of American States (OAS) so that the United States could retaliate. The U.S. Department of Defense document says of one of the scenarios, "A contrived 'Cuban' 

attack on an OAS member could be set up, and the attacked state could be urged to take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and OAS."

The plan expressed confidence that by this action, "the U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action 

against Cuba."^[16][18]

Included in the nations the Joint Chiefs suggested as targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Since both were members of the British 

Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs hoped that by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could incite the people of the United Kingdom 

into supporting a war against Castro.^[16] As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted:

Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with

very great difficulty. If the decision should be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U.S. personnel is limited only to the

most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of the contrived situation."^[16]

The U.S. Department of Defense report even suggested covertly paying a person in the Castro government to attack the United States: "The only area remaining for 

consideration then would be to bribe one of Castro's subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on [the U.S. Navy base at] Guantanamo."^[16]

Reaction[edit]

The continuing push against the Cuban government by internal elements of the U.S. military and intelligence communities (the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban 

Project, etc.) had already prompted President John F. Kennedy to attempt to rein in burgeoning hardline anti-Communist sentiment that was intent on proactive, 

aggressive action against communist movements around the globe. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had fired CIA director Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director Charles P. 

Cabell, and Deputy Director Richard Bissell, and turned his attention towardsVietnam. Kennedy had also stripped the CIA of responsibility for paramilitary operations 

like the Bay of Pigs and turned them over to the U.S. Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, as Commander in Chief, Kennedy could more directly 

control. Personally, Kennedy expressed outrage to many of his associates about the CIA's growing influence on civilians and government inside America^{[citation needed]}, 

and his attempt to curtail the CIA's extensive Cold War and paramilitary operations was a direct expression of this concern.

Kennedy personally rejected the Northwoods proposal, and it would now be the Joint Chiefs' turn to incur his displeasure. A JCS/Pentagon document (Ed Lansdale 

memo) dated 16 March 1962 titled MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 16 MARCH 1962 reads: "General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans 

for U.S. intervention. Also it had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretext either attacks on U.S. aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for 

which we could retaliate. The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S so engaged in Berlin 

or elsewhere that he couldn't use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba."^[19] The proposal was sent for approval to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, but was 

not implemented. (Some fifty years later when asked about the plot by journalist David Talbot, Robert McNamara drew a blank. "I have absolutely zero recollection of it. 

But I sure as hell would have rejected it," McNamara said, adding, "I really can't believe that anyone was proposing such provocative acts in Miami. How stupid!"^[20])

Following presentation of the Northwoods plan, Kennedy removed Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he became Supreme Allied Commander 

of NATO in January 1963. American armed forces leaders began to perceive Kennedy as going soft on Cuba, and the President became increasingly unpopular with the 

military, a rift that came to a head during Kennedy's disagreements with the service chiefs over the Cuban Missile Crisis.

On 3 August 2001, the National Assembly of People's Power of Cuba (the main legislative body of the Republic of Cuba) issued a statement referring to Operation 

Northwoods and Operation Mongoose wherein it condemned such U.S. government plans.^[21]

H.R.4310 - Dissemination Abroad Of Information About The United States

Congressional authorization of funding for government produced propaganda intended for "foreign" audiences.

H.R.4310

One Hundred Twelfth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the third day of January, two thousand and twelve

An Act

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013’.
SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.
For purposes of this Act, the term ‘congressional defense committees’ has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle H--Other Matters

Sec. 1078. Dissemination abroad of information about the United States.




SEC. 1078. DISSEMINATION ABROAD OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES.

(a) United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948- Section 501 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1461) is amended to read as follows:

‘GENERAL AUTHORIZATION

‘Sec. 501. (a) The Secretary and the Broadcasting Board of Governors are authorized to use funds appropriated or otherwise made available for public diplomacy information programs to provide for the preparation, dissemination, and use of information intended for foreign audiences abroad about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, the Internet, and other information media, including social media, and through information centers, instructors, and other direct or indirect means of communication.




‘(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary and the Broadcasting Board of Governors may, upon request and reimbursement of the reasonable costs incurred in fulfilling such a request, make available, in the United States, motion pictures, films, video, audio, and other materials disseminated abroad pursuant to this Act, the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.), the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1465 et seq.), or the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1465aa et seq.). Any reimbursement pursuant to this paragraph shall be credited to the applicable appropriation account of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, as appropriate. The Secretary and the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall issue necessary regulations--
‘(A) to establish procedures to maintain such material;
‘(B) for reimbursement of the reasonable costs incurred in fulfilling requests for such material; and
‘(C) to ensure that the persons seeking release of such material have secured and paid for necessary United States rights and licenses.
‘(2) With respect to material disseminated abroad before the effective date of section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013--
‘(A) the Secretary and the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall make available to the Archivist of the United States, for domestic distribution, motion pictures, films, videotapes, and other material 12 years after the initial dissemination of the material abroad; and
‘(B) the Archivist shall be the official custodian of the material and shall issue necessary regulations to ensure that persons seeking its release in the United States have secured and paid for necessary United States rights and licenses and that all costs associated with the provision of the material by the Archivist shall be paid by the persons seeking its release, in accordance with paragraph (4).
‘(3) The Archivist may undertake the functions described in paragraph (1) on behalf of and at the request of the Secretary or the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
‘(4) The Archivist may charge fees to recover the costs described in paragraphs (1) and (2), in accordance with section 2116(c) of title 44, United States Code. Such fees shall be paid into, administered, and expended as part of the National Archives Trust Fund.
‘(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to require the Secretary or the Broadcasting Board of Governors to make material disseminated abroad available in any format other than in the format disseminated abroad.’.
(b) Rule of Construction- Nothing in this section, or in the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), may be construed to affect the allocation of funds appropriated or otherwise made specifically available for public diplomacy or to authorize appropriations for Broadcasting Board of Governors programming other than for foreign audiences abroad.
(c) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987- Section 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 (22 U.S.C. 1461-1a) is amended to read as follows:

‘SEC. 208. CLARIFICATION ON DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAM MATERIAL.

‘(a) In General- No funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States. This section shall apply only to programs carried out pursuant to the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.), the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1465 et seq.), and the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1465aa et seq.). This section shall not prohibit or delay the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors from providing information about its operations, policies, programs, or program material, or making such available, to the media, public, or Congress, in accordance with other applicable law.
‘(b) Rule of Construction- Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors from engaging in any medium or form of communication, either directly or indirectly, because a United States domestic audience is or may be thereby exposed to program material, or based on a presumption of such exposure. Such material may be made available within the United States and disseminated, when appropriate, pursuant to sections 502 and 1005 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1462 and 1437), except that nothing in this section may be construed to authorize the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors to disseminate within the United States any program material prepared for dissemination abroad on or before the effective date of section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
‘(c) Application- The provisions of this section shall apply only to the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors and to no other department or agency of the Federal Government.’.
(d) Conforming Amendments- The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 is amended--
(1) in section 502 (22 U.S.C. 1462)--
(A) by inserting ‘and the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ after ‘Secretary’; and
(B) by inserting ‘or the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ after ‘Department’; and
(2) in section 1005 (22 U.S.C. 1437), by inserting ‘and the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ after ‘Secretary’ each place it appears.
(e) Effective Date- This section shall take effect and apply on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section.

Alex Jones, Shill Of Rights

Propaganda intended for both sides of the argument. If you have chosen to support either side, they have succeeded. Alex Jones is nothing but a boot camp drill sergeant.

Rep. Markwayne Mullin Has An Extensive Background In Sewage

I was once a subcontractor in this man's home. He questions Obama's birth just as the Jews questioned the birth of Jesus. And he sets an example for all that are deceived: "Someone hires us to do a job, we don't ask them where the money comes from." Where does your treasure come from?

All Things Are Done In Parables

Awhile back, I commented on a video interview with Dan Rather in which he was "exposing" the behind the scenes activity within the "Mainstream Media" ("Tell Lie Vision" by Chrissy Sumer). I can no longer view the comments since the original video is missing and a new version is posted. I don't remember exactly what I said, but it was along the lines of Dan Rather never leaving the Hollywood news industry. The man is and throughout his career has been an actor. Anything he says to those that are blind is not exactly what it seems. Just as "the law having a shadow of good things to come, not the very image of the things" these men speak according to God's will. Now, do I mean these men are men of God? No. Words bring about life and death. Life unto those that have ears to hear. Death unto those that do not. Satan's tempting of Christ in the wilderness is an example of this. He used the word of God in an attempt to deceive Jesus into following him. The same word which brings life was used in an attempt to deceive into death. The first instance of this was in the garden of Eden when the serpent took God's word and perverted it. Since everything goes according to the Lord's will, then even the words spoken by these men of corrupt minds are spoken according to his will. Do they know they are doing this? No. If someone is being deceived, they themselves do not know they are being deceived. Does that mean that the Creator is a deceiver? No. He uses another one of his creations, Satan the deceiver, and allows it to take place. For he has said, "Because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. And for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie: that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." So, if one is to disregard what is said by these reporters and politicians and celebrities and the like, they don't necessarily better themselves. To shut off the television, stop using the internet, or attempt to eliminate all forms of what the world's churches want to call secular influence, though their intentions to live better might be present, they, who claim to have ears to hear truth, eliminate the ability to better communicate to those who are enthralled and greatly affected in their everyday living by the deceptions presented to them. To disregard what is said by these people is like blotting out everything that was said by Cain, Pharaoh, Goliath, Saul in pursuit of David, all the kings of the foreign nations, Herod, Pontius Pilate,  Judas Iscariot, and many others. It wouldn't make sense. I have found, that, the more these people talk, the more they say. As ridiculous as that may sound, the more they talk, the less interest the viewing public typically is in listening to everything they say. As soon as they've spewed out the entertaining garbage that is more readily received by those that are most easily deceived, they change gears and turn their focus on those who want to see what goes on "behind the scenes". Although, a blind man cannot actually see what is presented to him. He can only assume it is truly presented before him, take another's word for it, or imagine what it seems to be, yet cannot get the very image of the thing. He has said unto his disciples, "Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are outside, all things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest at any time they should be converted, and sins should be forgiven them."
Whether it's in politics, entertainment, news (which is entertainment and propaganda) in all forms (television, radio, internet, newspapers, magazines, advertisements, and yes, even word of mouth), economics, medicine, astronomy, nature, etc., everything is intended to bring everyone back to the Creator. It is intended to instruct and to destruct. To tear down and build up again.

Nothing New Under The Hollywood Sun

What do most people do when Hollywood produces a classic remake? The hype is much greater, and it is viewed by more people than ever before. It is intensely scrutinized, and the criticism is greatly advertised.